The fact that bubbles exist on collectibles does not imply that they exist on assets like stocks or land, and still less that bubbles on such assets are quantitatively important if they do exist. It is possible that there are arguments against bubbles that apply to securities but not to collectibles. However, the reasoning just presented creates a presumption in favor of bubbles: if highly valued Þne art objects are bubbles, why would the stock of corporations that own art objects not have a bubble component?
In this paper we will look at data on US stock prices and related series with a view to determining whether they can plausibly be explained without resorting to bubbles (Sections 2 and 3). Of course, our attention will be drawn to the price runup and collapse over the most recent decade. We will argue that this behavior cannot successfully be so explained. As Shiller [64] and others have argued, stock price volatility exceeds that which is consistent with the present-value relation. We interpret this as favoring bubbles.
It is true that there exist possible explanations for observed stock price volatility other than bubbles. Of these the most attractive on theoretical grounds is stochastic discount factors (Section 4); of course, this is not to deny that bubbles and stochastic discount factors can coexist.
Risk aversion induces a stochastic component in discount factors, thereby generally invalidating the constant discount factor version of the present-value model used in the variance bounds tests. SpeciÞcally, risk aversion induces asset price volatility greater than that which would occur if agents were risk neutral, at least in some settings. However, the theory of consumption-based asset pricing, while generating a theoretically coherent account of how risk aversion affects asset prices, turns out to be a failure empirically.
In Section 5 the discussion is specialized to the events of the 1990s. We brießy consider and reject alternatives to the bubbles hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper deals with bubbles. Bubbles are taken to be synonymous with irrationality, universally in the popular press, but also sometimes in academic discussions. Especially given the recent ascendancy of behavioral Þnance, it is appropriate to digress (Section 6) to consider what, if anything, it means to appeal to irrationality in a substantive economic explanation of economic phenomena. It will be suggested that this is a dead end.
In Sections 7-10 the discussion is restricted to rational bubbles-instances of asset prices exceeding present values in models in which agents optimize in an environment which they understand. Established professional opinion holds that there exist robust theoretical arguments against existence of such bubbles. Such argument are in fact anything but robust. We note that bubbles cannot generally be ruled out on purely theoretical grounds. In an important class of models-overlapping generations models-bubbles can be ruled out under certain values for key parameters, but the evidence is far from clear that these parameter restrictions are satisÞed. Even if they are satisÞed, the argument for nonexistence of bubbles in such settings requires an implausibly literal-minded application of a rational expectations argument. 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 The Data Figure 1 shows the value of equity (from the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds accounts) divided by GDP. Data are from the 1950s to now. The salient feature of this series is its dominance by low-frequency components. Stock prices rose in the 50s and 60s, fell in the 70s, rose in the 80s and 90s and, so far in the 21st century, have been falling. The high-frequency component of stock price variation that dominates Þnancial reporting is seen to be of minor importance by comparison with the low-frequency variation just discussed. The runup over the period 1995-2000 is conspicuous, as is the even more rapid subsequent collapse in prices. Figure 2 shows stock values normalized instead by National Income Accounts corporate earnings. For most of the sample period the two Þgures look similar. To the extent that price-earnings ratios show variations similar to price-GDP ratios, the interpretation is that stock price variations cannot be viewed as simply a proportional response to parallel trends in earnings. One might argue that for most of the sample period the low-frequency variation in Figure 2 is less pronounced than that in Figure  1 , in which case the interpretation is that stock price variations are correlated with variations in earnings relative to GDP, with the stock price variation being of greater amplitude.
The runup of stock prices in the late 1990s appears similar in the two series, suggesting that it cannot be viewed as a proportional response to spectacular increases in earnings. Indeed, Figure 3 , which displays aftertax corporate earnings as a proportion of GDP, shows that while earnings rose in the late 1990s, even at their peak they were a smaller proportion of GDP than during most of the postwar period.
In contrast, the collapse in stock prices over the past several years that is con- 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 Figure 1 has no counterpart in Figure 2 . The reason is that, as Figure  3 shows, corporate earnings underwent an even more pronounced drop than stock prices as the US economy entered a recession. Consequently the price-earnings ratio rose even as the price-GDP ratio fell. Partial data for 2002 (not displayed), in fact, show a further increase in the price-earnings ratio. Our Þrst question is whether these variations in stock prices are within the range that is appropriate under the present-value model, given the variation of corporate earnings and dividends. In the next section we use a variance-bounds test to show that they are not.
The Stochastic Gordon Model
The point of reference in interpreting stock price data will initially be the Gordon [31] model. Subsequently we will generalize to a stochastic version of the model. The deterministic version of the Gordon model is generated by Þve assumptions: (1) the return on invested capital is constant over time, (2) the rate of earnings retention (equivalently, dividend payout) is constant over time, (3) retained earnings generate the same returns as preexisting capital (so that there are no opportunities for extranormal earnings), (4) the value of equity equals the discounted value of future dividends (so that there are no bubbles), and (5) the discount factor is constant over time, with the discount rate equal to the rate of return on invested capital. Under these assumptions it is easy to show that the present-value model implies that p, the value of equity, is given by Here r is the discount rate, d is the current dividend, e is current earnings and g = r(1 − δ) is the growth rate of the dividend stream, where δ is the dividend payout rate (proportion of earnings paid out as dividends). Thus the value of equity can be represented either as the present value of a growing dividend stream or as the present value of a constant earnings stream (Miller and Modigliani [53] ). The independence of p from δ reßects the Miller-Modigliani proposition that (in this simple environment) for given earnings the future dividend payout rate does not affect current equity value. For the present purpose, the main shortcoming of the Gordon model is that it is deterministic. As such, it provides no insight into stock price ßuctuations. To remedy this deÞciency we replace the assumption that the return on capital is constant with the assumption that the earnings growth rate is independently and identically distributed over time or, put differently, that earnings follow a geometric random walk. 1 We refer to the model that results from this generalization as the stochastic Gordon model.
The Þrst four autocorrelations of the earnings growth rate are 0.050, −0.145, −0.340 and −0.078 (annual data, 1958 to 2000), so one would not want to defend too strongly here the assumption that they are white noise. The predominantly negative autocorrelations imply that earnings have a mean-reverting component. To the extent that investors take this mean-reversion into account in valuing stocks, the model to be presented gives an upward-biased account of stock price volatility. Figure 4 shows the interest rate less the growth rate of earnings; the series looks like an IID process. Figure 5 shows the dividends-earnings ratio. Obviously the 1 The geometric random walk was found more that 40 years ago to give an accurate description of corporate earnings (Little and Rayner [57] , Reddaway [58] ). 2 The attractive feature of this variable is that we do not have to worry about inßation adjustment, since the inßation correction involved in Þguring real earnings growth exactly offsets that involved assumption adopted in the stochastic Gordon model that the dividends-earnings ratio is constant is an oversimpliÞcation; dividends are well modeled as a highly smoothed function of past earnings, implying that dividends-earnings ratios will vary as earnings ßuctuates. Nevertheless, the series appears to be strongly mean-reverting, so the failure of dividends to adjust fully to earnings changes should not greatly distort security prices relative to the prediction of the Gordon model.
In order to determine the behavior of stock prices implied by the stochastic Gordon model we need in addition to specify investors' information. Two extreme cases can be speciÞed: (1) investors have complete information about future earnings, and (2) investors have no information beyond the current level of earnings that enables them to forecast future earnings. Each of these extreme cases generates a volatility bound: the Þrst on the volatility of the price-earnings ratio, the second on the volatility of the rate of return.
The more information about the future investors have, the more volatile will be the price-earnings ratio. This will be demonstrated below, but the idea is intuitive: if investors have no future information about earnings, they will price stock at a constant multiple of current earnings, so the price-earnings ratio will have zero variance. To the extent that investors have information about future earnings realizations, they will price stocks at varying multiples of earnings. An upper bound on the variance of the price-dividend ratio will be generated in the perfect certainty case. LeRoy and Parke [46] showed 3 that this variance is given by the right-hand side of the following inequality, so the variance bound is
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Figure 5: Dividends/Earnings
Here β is the discount rate, and µ and σ 2 are the mean and variance, respectively, of the earnings growth rate. Inequality (2) is essentially the same as the variance bound of LeRoy-Porter [47] , adapted to the geometric random walk case. Inserting estimated parameters and converting to standard deviations, the upper bound on price volatility is 7.274, whereas the standard deviation of the actual price-earnings ratio is 8.945. Thus the point estimates indicate excess volatility.
Just as increasing information increases the volatility of the price-earnings ratio, it decreases the volatility of the rate of return: in the extreme case in which investors know the entire future path of earnings, the volatility of the rate of return will be zero. It follows that the case in which investors have no information beyond current earnings will generate an upper bound on the variance of the rate of return. The variance of the rate of return under the geometric random walk if investors have no information about future earnings growth rates is given by the right-hand side of the following inequality, so the analogue to (2) is
Inequality (3) 
Here V (p * /e) equals the upper bound of the variance of the price-earnings ratio (the right-hand side of (2)). Inserting values for V (p/e) in (4) and solving for V (r) allows us to plot the locus of pairs of price volatility and return volatility that are consistent with the Gordon model. Testing that V (p/e) and V (r) satisfy (4), as a test of an equality rather than an inequality, has better econometric properties than either of the bounds tests described above. Figure 6 shows the locus of standard deviations of the price-earnings ratios and rates of return that are consistent with estimated parameter values (standard deviations are easier to interpret than variances). The diagram displays a dot representing the estimated standard deviations from US stock data. As the diagram makes clear, the volatility measures are higher than the stochastic Gordon model implies.
The variance bounds tests have two major shortcomings: (1) they assume a constant discount factor, and (2) they exclude bubbles. In the following section we will consider the generalization to stochastic discount factors under the rubric of consumption-based asset pricing. We will follow many others in concluding that, however great the theoretical appeal of consumption-based asset pricing, it is a failure empirically. This leaves bubbles, to which the remainder of the paper is devoted.
Consumption-Based Asset Pricing
The variance bounds test reported in Section 3 gave clear evidence that stock prices and returns are more volatile than the stochastic Gordon model predicts, given the estimated volatility of earnings. However, the stochastic Gordon model presumes a constant discount factor. This assumption, while attractive as a simpliÞcation, is very restrictive theoretically.
In stationary exchange economies with risk-neutral agents, asset prices will equal expected payoffs discounted at the risk-free interest rate. However, when agents are risk averse, expected returns will be different for different securities depending on their risk. The theory of consumption-based asset pricing, introduced in the economics literature by Lucas [50] , and in the Þnance literature by Breeden [10] , shows how asset valuation is altered by risk aversion.
Expositions of consumption-based asset pricing can be found in a variety of sources (for example Bossaerts [9] , Cochrane [15] , LeRoy and Werner [48] , or Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay [12] ; the latter gives a very clear discussion of the empirical tests of consumption-based asset pricing).
If agents' utilities are strictly concave functions of their consumption levels, equilibrium expected returns will depend on how asset payoffs covary with aggregate consumption. Risk-free returns and risk premia, both of which are assumed constant in the stochastic Gordon model, will be stochastic, and the latter will be different for different assets. Thus there is no reason to regard the variance bounds tests as necessarily applying in a world of risk-averse agents.
In fact, there are speciÞc reasons to expect that stock price volatility will exceed that implied by risk neutrality when agents are risk averse. When agents are risk averse they will be motivated to use portfolio transactions to smooth consumption, transferring it from high-consumption states and dates to low-consumption states and dates. In a representative agent exchange setting, they cannot do so in the aggregate. That being the case, asset prices must be such as to induce the representative agent to consume his endowment. SpeciÞcally, equilibrium asset prices will covary positively with consumption, and the more risk averse agents are, the higher the covariance must be. Thus risk aversion creates a presumption in favor of increased price volatility relative to risk neutrality. This argument was formalized by LaCivita and LeRoy [41] ; a related argument is found in Grossman and Shiller [32] .
As is well known, the problem with consumption-based asset pricing theory is that it appears to be a failure empirically. The implication that expected asset returns depend on covariances with consumption growth (or, in the market CAPM version, with the return on the market portfolio) appears not to be satisÞed in the data. Major papers demonstrating the failure of market CAPM and consumption CAPM are Hansen and Singleton [37] , Mehra and Prescott [52] , Hansen and Jagannathan [38] and Fama and French [20] . Given the failure of consumption-based asset pricing theory to provide an empirically successful account of changes in expected returns, we will proceed henceforth as if expected returns are constant. 4 Many analysts (Cochrane [14] , for example) conclude from the failure of consumption-based asset pricing theory that the quest for a successful implementation of the stochastic discount factor must continue, since we know that investors are risk averse. A variety of ever-more elaborate speciÞcations are being tried, ranging from nonexpected utility to transactions costs and various forms of market incompleteness. So far none of these modiÞcations appears to have succeeded, but the jury is still out. For the present, we can conclude that the fact that expected asset returns do not covary with aggregate consumption means that we lose little in terms of explanatory power by suppressing the dependence of discount factors on consumption. This amounts to accepting the assumption of the stochastic Gordon model that discount factors are constant.
The 1990s Price Runup
One possible explanation for the price runup of the 1990s is that the advent of the internet led to a creation of new capital on the order of several trillion dollars. How this capital came into existence is unclear; it cannot have resulted from retained earnings as measured in the national income accounts because these, although somewhat higher than usual in the late 90s, were an order of magnitude lower than the stock price runup. Further, the very modest increase in aggregate corporate earnings suggests either that a large component of the return on this new capital went unmeasured or that the return per unit of capital (earnings-price ratio) suffered a sharp drop. Finally, the stock price declines of the last several years imply that this new capital disappeared even more rapidly than it had materialized. See Hall [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] for further discussion along these lines. In the absence of any evidence in favor of this hypothesis other than the fact that a huge change in stock prices occurred unaccompanied by anything like a commensurate change in measured corporate earnings, it is difficult to evaluate it.
Another possible line would generalize the Gordon model to relax the assumption that the return per unit of capital is an IID process (Hall [35] ). If the term r −g in the denominator of (1) is time-varying, variations in the price-earnings ratio would result. Figure 4 displays the long-term nominal interest rate on 10-year US Treasury debt less the growth rate of corporate earnings over the previous year. The combination of declining nominal interest rates and increasing corporate earnings imply that r − g was indeed low in the years 1995-2000.
Whether the deviation from trend during these years is sufficient quantitatively to explain the stock price runup is difficult to determine without specifying how investors form expectations of earnings, and deriving an analogue to the Gordon model that is appropriate under that speciÞcation. Mehra and Prescott [52] developed a two-state generalization of the Gordon model assuming that investors have rational expectations of future earnings growth rates. That their model leads to puzzles when confronted with the data is well known. Direct implementation of a calibrated version of their model does not generate a stock price runup of anything like the requisite magnitude. 5 
Rationality and Irrationality
In Section 3 we identiÞed two possible explanations for the excess volatility of stock prices and returns: stochastic discount factors and bubbles. Having rejected stochastic discount factors on empirical grounds, we are left with bubbles. The remainder of this paper will make the case that rational bubbles (deÞned below) are the most attractive candidate to explain stock prices. In this section we discuss the meaning of rationality in the context of bubbles.
What are bubbles? The term "bubble" is much used in the media, almost never with a clear meaning. The question "Do you think internet stocks (real estate, Japanese stocks) are or were a bubble?" is badly in need of clariÞcation. Most simply, it appears that the questioner wants to know if prices will collapse any time soon. Along these lines, a bubble means a price increase that is shortly followed by a price decrease. Alternatively, the questioner wants to know if there is a rational basis for current valuations, so that asset prices being a bubble is synonymous with valuations having no rational basis. This usage is virtually universal in the Þnancial media, and is adopted also in some academic treatments of bubbles. 6 Given the large role assigned to irrationality, somehow deÞned, in the behavioral Þnance literature that has been in the ascendancy in recent Þnancial economics, it is worth pointing out that there exists an independent line of research on bubbles that identiÞes these, not with irrationality of any sort, but with security prices that exceed the (expected risk-adjusted) present values of the associated payoffs. This was the deÞnition of bubbles that was presumed in the postage stamp example discussed in the introduction above.
Bubbles so deÞned can occur in equilibrium under conditions that are well understood, at least in theoretical terms, as we will see below. Bubbles can be ruled out on theoretical grounds only under assumptions that, we will argue, are altogether implausible. On grounds of parsimony, therefore, no appeal to irrationality is needed to sustain the view that asset prices can systematically exceed present values.
Before presenting this discussion it is appropriate to consider irrational bubbles further. First, we note the ambiguity of the terms "rational" and "irrational" as used in the behavioral Þnance literature, and also the divergence between the meanings of these terms in behavioral Þnance and their meanings in economics. Given the importance of the idea of rationality in economic theory, together with the central role assigned to irrationality in behavioral Þnance, it is remarkable how little serious discussion these ideas have received.
The view of rationality implicit in mainstream nonÞnancial economic theory is that rationality is not a substantive hypothesis about the world, but rather is a conceptual tool. In fact, the idea of rationality provides the basis for a good working deÞnition of an economic model: a model describing human (or, for that matter, animal) behavior is an economic model insofar as it assumes consistent choice. Along these lines there is no room for irrational behavior: apparently irrational behavior is actually evidence of omitted costs or the like. As this argument makes clear, taking rationality as an analytical tool rather than a substantive hypothesis gives it a tautologous character: as part of a maintained hypothesis, no conceivable evidence can contradict rationality.
A generation ago Þnancial economists fully accepted this view of rationality, if the term "market efficiency" is substituted for "rationality": in his classic [19] survey of efficient capital markets Eugene Fama emphasized that market efficiency can be tested only in conjunction with a particular market model. 7 Contemporary exponents of behavioral Þnance are much more sympathetic to the idea of irrationality than mainstream Þnancial economists were a generation ago. However, in making their point that irrationality plays a greater role in Þnancial markets than hitherto believed, exponents of behavioral Þnance have altered the deÞnition of rationality. Irrationality no longer connotes the theoretical property of nontransitivity, as would seem to follow from the deÞnition of rationality in economic theory. Rather, irrationality is now identiÞed with the existence of noise traders, agents who trade for reasons that are not modeled.
Models in which some of the economic behavior being modeled is taken as given have been known in the economic literature as partial equilibrium models, as distinguished from general equilibrium models in which all agents are represented as optimizing subject to constraint. There is no identiÞcation of partial equilibrium with irrationality. It is difficult to see the advantage in broadening-and blurringthe deÞnition of irrationality as the advocates of behavioral Þnance have done, but there is little doubt that this has happened.
In the earlier Þnance literature the existence of noise traders was seen as consistent with market efficiency as long as the noise traders coexisted with rational agents. The major propositions of neoclassical Þnance theory, such as the risk-return tradeoff, will survive the presence of noise traders as long as the rational agents are sufficient in numbers (and wealth) so that their optima are interior.
It is true that in some of the earlier discussions of market efficiency it was presumed that the rational agents would completely arbitrage away the effects of noise trades on security prices. This conclusion, we now know, follows only if agents are risk neutral, since then all securities are perfect substitutes and rational traders will bid all assets to prices that imply equal expected returns. If agents are risk averse, the rational agents will generally not completely eliminate the effect of noise traders on security prices. This is so because risk-averse traders will rationally reject trades that exploit minor mispricing because of their risk. This result provides the basis for much of the recent enthusiasm for behavioral Þnance. This is so despite the fact that it can be derived using completely neoclassical (but partial equilibrium, given the assumed presence of noise traders) methods (Shleifer [66] ), and despite the fact noted in the preceding paragraph that most properties of mainstream Þnance theory obtain even in the presence of noise traders.
In the preceding paragraphs we have argued on methodological grounds against attributing bubbles to noise traders. The same conclusion can be reached using a more pragmatic line of reasoning. The presumed irrationality of the noise traders motivates rational traders to bet against them. To be sure, as Shleifer emphasized, rational traders will not completely offset the effect of noise trades on prices, but they will always take positions against the noise traders. In the case of the 1990s stock price runup in the US, it would have been easy for any rational trader to bet against the bubble by, for example, selling NASDAQ futures short or buying NASDAQ puts. Few perceived doing so as an attractive trading opportunity, and a fair number of those who did make this bet posted spectacular losses because of bad timing. The unwillingness of apparently rational market participants to bet against the bubble indicates that the perceived return distribution was not attractive. This is equivalent to asserting that those who took long positions in securities with bubbles were not irrational.
In models of noise traders the irrational agents have systematically worse outcomes than the rational agents in utility terms-that is what calling them irrational means. The traders are not aware of the suboptimal nature of their trades; if they were, they would trade rationally. In contrast to this account, during the late 1990s the Þnancial press included innumerable discussions of whether current stock prices were a bubble, so it is hard to believe that traders did not at least consider that possibility. SigniÞcantly, many traders who took long positions in dot-com stocks and the like believed that stock prices exceeded fundamental values. 8 They did not see this as implying that they were trading incorrectly, for the simple reason that they believed that the gap between price and fundamental value was at least as likely to increase as to decrease. Awareness of the existence of a bubble is inconsistent with the noise trader interpretation, but perfectly consistent with rational bubbles.
Rational Bubbles under Simultaneous Markets
The argument of the preceding section suggests that we are unlikely to make progress in analyzing bubbles if we put some economic behavior off limits by attributing it to noise traders. Relying on traditional general equilibrium analysis appears to be a more promising research strategy. Thus we restrict ourselves henceforth to the analysis of rational bubbles-meaning that agents optimize in environments that they understand (subject to a qualiÞcation discussed below), and in particular that they have rational expectations.
As noted above, a security has a bubble if its price exceeds the discounted value of its expected payoffs. Formally, suppose that agents are risk neutral (this involves no material loss of generality because, as is well known, risk aversion can be handled by distorting the probability measure). Then the expected returns on all securities are equal, impling that the equilibrium price p t of a security satisÞes
where r t+1 is the interest rate from t to t + 1 and E t denotes conditional expectation.
Replacing t by t + 1 in (5), substituting in (5) and invoking the rule of iterated expectations, there results
Repeating this substitution n times yields
Taking the limit (which will exist under very weak assumptions) as n goes to inÞnity gives
where
Here f t is the fundamental value of the security-the expected discounted value of its Þnite-date payoffs-and b t is the bubble. If the bubble is zero, the price of the security equals the expected discounted value of its payoff. If, in contrast, the bubble term is positive, then securities are overpriced relative to their fundamentals. 9 This does not imply existence of a trading opportunity because the overpricing is expected to continue in the future.
An obvious implication of this development is that (nonzero) bubbles can exist only in models that allow for an inÞnite future. It follows that nontrivial analysis of bubbles cannot be conducted using classical general equilibrium theory because of the Þnite-dimensional nature of the associated models. This complicates matters considerably: there exist more than one possible generalization of classical equilibrium theory to inÞnite-dimensional settings (even maintaining the assumption of competitiveness, as we do throughout). For the present purpose the important question is whether markets are characterized as simultaneous or sequential. In the completemarkets case these are equivalent when time is Þnite (Arrow [2] ), but not in the inÞnite case that is relevant here. Further, the alternative speciÞcations have different implications for bubbles. Analysis of bubbles in the simultaneous markets case is presented in this section, while sequential markets are considered in the following section.
In simultaneous-markets settings the analyst maintains the convention of Þnite-date general equilibrium theory that contingent claims are traded in timeless markets 9 Negative bubbles can be ruled out on assets that can be freely disposed of, such as stocks. The reason is that in the presence of a negative bubble the present-value relation implies that the price of the security will eventually become negative with probability 1, which conßicts with free disposal. Nonnegativity of bubbles is frequently incorrectly attributed to the limited liability of corporations rather than to free disposal. Limited liability implies that the dividend of the asset is nonnegative, not that its price is nonnegative. It is possible to imagine a non-disposable asset with positive cash ßow at every date but negative price, because of a negative bubble. that, for concreteness, are best thought of as occurring before time begins (even when the models allow for an inÞnite past). This assumption is obviously abstract, but it is not clear that it is more objectionable in the inÞnite-time case than in the Þnite-time case.
In models incorporating simultaneous markets equilibrium, the price system is represented by a positive linear function on the commodity space. The price of an individual security is assumed to equal the value taken on by that security's payoff under the equilibrium price function, just as in the Þnite case in which it is routinely invoked.
In some settings the price function is representable by state prices. When that is the case the payoff of any security equals its fundamental value (the sum of its payoffs multiplied by the appropriate state prices), so that there are no bubbles. However, in inÞnite-dimensional spaces linear functions can take a form that does not allow representation by state prices. For example, suppose that there is no uncertainty and that time is countable. Let the price system p(x) be
where ρ is a constant, for all x such that the limit exists. Note that this price system, although not of a conventional form, is concave and does incorporate discounting when ρ > 0. It has the property that any commodity bundle x that is nonzero at only a Þnite number of dates has zero value. The same is true of any commodity bundle that has a limiting discounted value of zero. Under price functions of the form (10), all state prices equal zero, implying that valuation cannot be identiÞed with state prices. Since the fundamental value of any commodity bundle is identiÞed with the limit of the sums of the values of its Þnite-date payoffs, the fact that these values are zero implies that all commodity bundles have zero fundamental value under the price system (10) . Thus all values are bubbles. 10 Modeling bubbles in this way was initially proposed by Gilles [27] , and was developed in Gilles and LeRoy [28] , [29] . Of course, the price system (10) is highly unrealistic because of its implication that all Þnitely nonzero commodity bundles have zero value. However, the price system
which combines the component (10) with a component incorporating conventional state prices, implies that the value of any commodity bundle may be decomposed unambiguously into a fundamental component and a bubble component, either of which may equal zero. This is not so obviously unrealistic. Under this treatment bubbles are identiÞed with the tails of commodity bundles. If the model-builder restricts preferences and/or admissible commodity bundles so that the rightmost term in (11) equals zero for all admissible commodity bundles, then there can exist no bubbles. In a general setting this involves restricting preferences and/or admissible commodity bundles so that preferences are Mackey-continuous (Bewley [5] ) on the set of admissible commodity bundles. Thus ruling out bubbles amounts to restricting preferences and/or commodity bundles so that their tails make zero contribution to their present values.
In the foregoing development, whether or not a model economy has bubbles depends on the form of the price system. Under a different speciÞcation of the commodity space and price system bubbles are associated with payoffs rather than price systems (Gilles and LeRoy [30] ). Under that respeciÞcation fundamental payoffs are those that occur at Þnite dates, whereas bubbles are payoffs that occur "at inÞnity". In this alternative usage, for example, the payoff of a self-Þnancing portfolio strategy has zero fundamental, implying that the initial cost of the portfolio strategy equals the value of the bubble under the equilibrium price system. This notion of inÞnity can be made precise mathematically using functional analysis (the branch of mathematical analysis that studies inÞnite-dimensional linear spaces and linear functions), but this is not the place for such discussion.
Rational Bubbles under Sequential Markets
An attractive feature of the analysis of bubbles under simultaneous markets is that the required departures from classical general equilibrium are minor, consisting of little more than respecifying commodity and price spaces to be inÞnite-dimensional. 11 However, simultaneous-markets models have some disadvantages: they presume the existence of complete markets. Also, the assumption that trading occurs simultaneously strikes many economists as implausible. Under sequential markets agents trade at each date rather than simultaneously, implying that they face separate budget constraints at each date and event.
The intuitive attractiveness of sequential markets is mitigated by the attendant assumption usually made that agents know security prices at future events (Radner [56] ). That assumption is satisÞed deÞnitionally under simultaneous markets because the Þction of the auctioneer is maintained, but not under sequential markets. Under sequential markets the assumption is usually defended by a loose appeal to rational expectations, the plausibility of which depends on how recursive the economy is.
An essential feature of models incorporating sequential markets is that they necessarily impose trading restrictions. Otherwise the possibility of Ponzi schemesborrowing money and rolling over the indebtedness forever-precludes existence of optima (this problem does not occur under simultaneous markets because of the integrated nature of intertemporal budget constraints in that setting). Major papers analyzing bubbles in sequential markets are Santos and Woodford [61] and Huang and Werner [39] . In the latter paper the authors compared bubbles under simultaneous markets with those under sequential markets; the two settings are surprisingly different. In sequential markets bubbles can occur only if trading restrictions rule out the arbitrage-short the security with a bubble and hold long securities that generate its dividends-that would exploit their existence.
More generally, the existence of trading restrictions under sequential markets limits the role of arbitrage in eliminating mispricing of any sort. For example, in continuous-time models the arbitrage that would exploit even a Þnite-time mispricing has unbounded sample paths (Liu and Longstaff [49] ). Therefore the existence of bounds on portfolio values implies that the position may have to be closed at a loss before the purported arbitrage has converged. The necessary existence of such trading restrictions is routinely ignored in applied Þnancial analysis (derivation of the Black-Scholes [7] option pricing model, for example).
Curiously, the existence of such limits to arbitrage has come to play a central role in supporting assertions that Þnancial markets are inefficient (Shleifer [66] , Barberis and Thaler [4] ). This is a complete inversion of logic. The existence of limits to arbitrage implies just the opposite: security prices that seem inconsistent with market efficiency because of the apparent existence of arbitrage are in fact consistent with it because the indicated arbitrage is infeasible along some sample paths. For example, the apparent mispricing of Royal Dutch/Shell shares does not imply any market inefficiency because of the riskiness of the implied arbitrage. 12 In fact, the apparent mispricing is properly interpreted as evidence of the existence of a bubble on whichever of the companies is overpriced (or, possibly, both companies). A parallel argument applies to closed-end mutual funds, which display similar pricing phenomena.
Models incorporating simultaneous markets have the unattractive feature that they cannot be decentralized since budget sets extend into the indeÞnite future. Sequential markets, in contrast, can at least potentially be decentralized. However, the trading restrictions incorporated in simultaneous markets models frequently preclude decentralized solutions. For example, it is frequently assumed that commodity bundles are Þnitely nonzero, that they have zero limits, or that they are bounded; these properties cannot be veriÞed at any Þnite date. Thus the possibility of decentralized implementation does not afford clear grounds for preferring either market speciÞcation to the other.
Many students of bubbles do not specify clearly whether they are assuming simultaneous or sequential markets, perhaps because they presume incorrectly that the equivalence between the two in Þnite settings carries over to inÞnite settings. An example of this ambiguity is given in the next section. Of those who are clearly assuming sequential markets, many Þnd the idea of analyzing bubbles in simultaneous markets difficult to understand or otherwise unattractive (for example, see Santos and Woodford [61] , note 3). The basis for this opinion is far from clear. As already noted, the two settings are equivalent in Þnite settings, so a preference for one over the other must reßect some intuitive idea of how people behave when the future has no Þnite endpoint. One would like to see the idea that sequential markets are more plausible than simultaneous markets defended explicitly. 13 
Conditions that Eliminate Bubbles
As observed in the introduction, many analysts take the view that there exists a strong theoretical presumption against the existence of bubbles, particularly in Þnite-agent settings (for example, Santos and Woodford [61] ). The simplest argument that eliminates bubbles is based on arbitrage: if under sequential markets agents can sell short arbitrary quantities of a security with a bubble and maintain the short position forever, and if they can hold long claims to the security's dividends, then they have an arbitrage. In that setting there can exist no bubble. If, on the other hand, the indicated portfolio strategy would violate trading restrictions, then there is no (feasible) arbitrage in the presence of a bubble, so the bubble can exist. In overlapping generations models it is typically assumed (often without explicit statement, as in Tirole [69] and in the discussion below) that agents can trade only when they are alive, so they cannot arbitrage away a bubble. The existence of equilibria with bubbles depends on this assumption.
One frequently encounters a purported proof that bubbles cannot occur in representative agent settings even if the agent is inÞnitely lived (Tirole [68] ; Obstfeld and Rogoff [55] ; Flood, Garber and Kaplan [22] ). Assume that the representative agent maximizes
β < 1, where U has standard properties. Let p t be the price of a capital good that produces the aggregate endowment c t , as in Lucas [50] . For any n the Euler equation can be written
where z t = U 0 (c t )p t and a t = U 0 (c t )c t . Letting n go to inÞnity, there results
The Þrst term on the right-hand side of (14) is held to equal the marginal utility gain from holding the asset forever, which must equal the left-hand side. Therefore the bubble term must equal zero. The problem with this argument depends on whether the model is interpreted as assuming simultaneous or sequential markets. In the former case the proof incorrectly generalizes from the utility function (12) , for which the argument is correct, to the general representative agent case, for which it is not. For example, if the representative agent has utility function that coincides with the price system (11) the argument fails. The reason is that the argument assumes that P n i=1 β i E t (a t+i ) converges to the utility gain from holding the asset forever. This transversality condition is satisÞed for the utility function (12), but not for (11) . Under the utility function (11), P n i=1 β i E t (a t+i ) = 0 for any n, so the limiting value must also equal 0. On the other hand, if the example is interpreted as assuming sequential markets, then there exists no equilibrium in the model as stated. This is so because the absence of trading restrictions implies that agents can conduct Ponzi schemes which, as noted above, is inconsistent with the existence of equilibria. Depending on what trading restrictions are added, bubbles may or may not be possible. For example, suppose that trading restrictions require each agent to hold at least a pro rata share of the aggregate endowment. Then bubbles can exist in equilibrium because agents cannot implement the arbitrage that would exploit the bubble. In general Þnite-agent settings it is known that there exists an intimate connection between what trading restrictions are assumed and whether or not bubbles can occur (Huang and Werner [39] ).
While blanket assertions that bubbles cannot occur in representative-agent models are seen to be false, it is true that bubbles can occur only in highly specialized cases: Mackey-discontinuous utility functions under simultaneous markets; trading restrictions that essentially force agents to hold securities with bubbles under sequential markets.
14 Assuming sequential markets, bubbles are much more likely to occur in inÞnite-agent economies than in Þnite-agent economies. To see why, we note a basic condition that eliminates bubbles in either Þnite-agent or inÞnite-agent economies: under weak characterizations of trading restrictions (not satisÞed, however, in the example of the preceding paragraph), bubbles cannot occur on securities in positive net supply if the aggregate endowment has Þnite value (Santos and Woodford [61] , Huang and Werner [39] ). The reason is that a bubble would confer wealth on some agents without creating new goods for the agents to consume, resulting in a violation of Walras' Law. 15 The condition that the aggregate endowment have Þnite value is satisÞed vacuously in Þnite-agent settings, but it may or may not be satisÞed in inÞnite-agent settings. Overlapping generations models are the standard example of economies with an inÞnite number of agents. Bubbles cannot occur in overlapping generations economies when the allocation is Pareto-efficient. In that case the aggregate endowment has Þnite value, so the preceding theorem applies. 16 Bubbles in overlapping generations models were Þrst studied in the macroeconomics literature in the context of determining when intrinsically useless money could be valued in equilibrium (Wallace [70] ); valued money is obviously a bubble because the fundamental value of money is zero. The fact that each generation lives for only a Þnite period does not prevent money from being valued because each generation passes the money to the next generation. General analysis of bubbles in overlapping generations models was Þrst provided by Tirole [69] . Blanchard and Fischer [8] Ch. 5 is a good exposition.
Whether bubbles can occur in overlapping generations models boils down to whether the equilibrium allocation is efficient. Standard practice at this point is to cite Abel et al. [1] , which argues that empirically the return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy, implying that the equilibrium allocation is in fact efficient and that therefore bubbles cannot exist.
The foregoing argument illustrates a recent tendency to appeal uncritically to rational expectations arguments, and also to rely, again uncritically, on an extreme reading of Milton's Friedman's [23] positivist defense of optimization. Let us decon-struct the argument that bubbles cannot exist (on securities in positive net supply) in efficient equilibria. Suppose that a bubble existed on some security. The bubble would constitute a wealth transfer to agents with positive endowments of that security. Walras' Law requires that some agent be subject to an offsetting negative wealth transfer at some date, possibly far in the future. But bubbles do not entail a negative wealth transfer at any future date, which contradicts the maintained assumption that the assumed equilibrium path is feasible into the inÞnite future. Realizing this, agents reprice the security in question so as to eliminate the bubble.
This line of reasoning uses the rational expectations argument that agents can calculate the trajectory of the economy into the arbitrarily distant future. Of course, it can be replied to this that the argument depends on agents acting as if they are making the calculation, not on the assumption that they actually do so. For example, following Friedman, it is not necessary that a skilled billiards player actually know the laws of mechanics, but just that he be able to play billiards as if he did. If he did not do so, he would not be a skilled billiards player.
Representing agents as optimizing in an environment that they understand is most plausible in repetitive situations. That is why billiards players practice: they encounter similar situations over and over again. In the context of bubbles, however, we are assuming that agents somehow come to understand the meaning of an eventmodel failure in the future along some equilibrium paths-that by deÞnition they have never experienced. This reasoning, which seems altogether implausible, goes unquestioned. This is especially odd given the recent enthusiasm for arguments involving irrationality in behavioral Þnance.
Similar issues have come up in capital theory. In the 1960s economists studied efficient paths of capital accumulation in the presence of many capital goods, focusing on whether these paths can be implemented as competitive equilibria. 17 Under conditions, Pareto-optimal equilibria display a turnpike property: from any initial condition the economy approaches that steady-state path on which the economy grows most quickly. In Þnite-time settings the economy spends most of its time in the vicinity of the turnpike, and then exits the turnpike in order to satisfy an assumed terminal condition. In inÞnite time the economy converges toward the steady-state growth path.
It follows that only one set of initial capital goods prices generates a path-that which converges to the steady state-that is feasible in inÞnite time. The other paths all fail in Þnite time. Shell and Stiglitz [63] , writing before it was customary to appeal routinely to rational expectations, saw no reason to conclude from this that the nonconvergent paths were infeasible. Given the absence of the futures markets that would have revealed the impending crisis, they assumed that agents had no way to foresee future problems. It was only later that economists came to rely on the inÞnite-time feasibility of equilibrium paths to eliminate indeterminacy in dynamic economic models. These issues are discussed in Stiglitz's [67] introduction to the 1990 Journal of Economic Perspectives symposium on bubbles, a paper which repays careful study.
Game theorists have been confronted with similar conundrums. Thoroughgoing application of rationality, and common knowledge of rationality, leads to serious conceptual difficulties. In some settings such apparently noncontroversial embodiments of rationality as Nash equilibrium are implausible (for example, Rubinstein [60] ), and there is even a question of whether the ideas of rationality and common knowledge of rationality have unambiguous meaning in strategic settings involving asymmetric information. These ideas are discussed in Binmore [6] . These problems have led game theorists to rely increasingly on experimentation rather than deductive theorizing. It seems likely that experiments will be equally fruitful in the study of bubbles (see Lei, Noussair and Plott [42] and the papers cited there for experimental studies of bubbles).
The foregoing discussion raises serious methodological issues for dynamic macroeconomics. If, as argued, unswerving application of the positivist-rational expectations paradigm is implausible in the context of models incorporating an inÞnite future, it is at least methodologically coherent. Admitting paths that are not viable in inÞnite time raises awkward questions of when agents realize that the end is near, and how they behave when they learn this. We have no answers to these questions. As a stopgap, the best course of action may be to analyze bubbles within the framework of rational expectations models the equilibria of which are not assumed to be efficient. This is not the place to pursue these lines. It seems fair to conclude, however, that the widely-encountered idea that there exists a strong theoretical presumption against the existence of bubbles is incorrect.
Bubbles and Sunspots
Many discussions of bubbles treat these as synonymous with sunspots. 18 Sunspots occur when asset prices or other endogenous economic variables depend on nonfundamental uncertainty; bubbles occur when security prices are higher than fundamentals justify. The common presence of the term "fundamental" in these deÞnitions misleads many into thinking that sunspots and bubbles are two equivalent terms for the same thing. In fact the ideas are completely different. "Fundamental value" in the deÞnition of bubbles refers to the component of value given by discounting Þnite-date payoffs. This has no relation to "fundamentals" in the deÞnition of sunspots, which refers to intrinsic uncertainty (uncertainty about variables like endowments that would be expected to be determinants of equilibrium values of endogenous variables).
As the foregoing observation suggests, bubbles can occur without sunspots and vice-versa. First, it is easy to construct models in which equilibrium is unique and deterministic, but in which some or all assets have bubbles. Such models, being deterministic, do not have sunspots. Correspondingly, it is equally easy to construct Þnite-date models with multiple equilibria. Randomizing over these equilibria produces sunspots, but because the models have a Þnite number of dates there can be no bubbles.
Despite the fact that the deÞnitions of bubbles and sunspots are unrelated, it turns out that in some models of interest the conditions under which bubbles and sunspots can occur coincide. To see this, note that deterministic overlapping generations models in which the endowment allocation is inefficient have a continuum of equilibrium paths with bubbles. Randomizing over these paths introduces sunspots. In contrast, when the endowment allocation is efficient there cannot exist bubbles, as shown above. Further, equilibrium is unique, so there are no sunspots. 19 It is seen that inefficient overlapping generations equilibria produce both bubbles and sunspots, whereas neither can occur under efficient equilibria.
This result justiÞes the interpretation of the variance bounds tests described in Section 3 above as favoring the existence of bubbles: if conditions are such that the economy can produce bubbles, it is likely that the equilibrium randomizes over multiple equilibria, producing excess volatility of asset prices.
Conclusion
As the title of this paper implies 20 , we are arguing that the best explanation for the outstanding characteristics of stock prices-high volatility of prices and returns, plus a major price runup and decline over the decade just ended-is that the stock market is best modeled as an equilibrium exhibiting both rational bubbles and sunspots. It is true that there exists a theoretical argument that eliminates bubbles, as summarized above. That line of reasoning, although formally valid, is so recondite that it is understood only by highly trained theorists. It is a testament to economists' capacities for abstraction that they take seriously the possibility that this theoretical line has somehow gravitated from the pages of Econometrica to the New York Stock Exchange.
Turning to empirical considerations, the volatility of security prices and returns is the clearest evidence of the presence of sunspots and bubbles. As frequently observed, it is conceivable that various forms of model misspeciÞcation could also produce the phenomena that we are attributing to bubbles, but there has been little progress in 19 We are assuming a single good here. For discussion of the dimensionality of equilibrium in the general case, see Geanakoplos [26] and the papers cited there. 20 At this writing (February 2003) the term "exuberance" describes the stock market less well than when the project was begun during the twentieth century. However, it is worth pointing out that, despite the current negative tone, the stock market now is at about the same level as it was in 1996 when Alan Greenspan warned of irrational exuberance. developing such alternatives. One would like to see the development of empirical tests that could distinguish between bubbles and misspeciÞcation. 21 The contention that the bubbles are rational is controversial. How, it is argued, could any rational person buy dot-com stocks at the prices prevailing in 1999? This is, of course, 20-20 hindsight; things were not so obvious at the time. Perhaps Þve years from now we will say the same thing about real estate prices in southern California. Those who are conÞdent of the existence of a class of rational traders who can reliably identify and bet against the bubbles will be comfortable with the idea that these are nonrational bubbles, since as noted rational but risk-averse traders will not completely arbitrage away the bubbles. Those who, like me, are not conÞdent of this will prefer the rational bubbles alternative, so that bubbles do not in fact offer any trading opportunities.
Academic Þnancial economists think about stock prices as the discounted values of their dividend streams. Practitioners accept this story "theoretically"-here "theoretically" has the usual undergraduate meaning of according to some classroom model that they have to learn-but don't think this story has much to do with reality. This puts economists in the awkward position of believing that despite their stated skepticism in the classroom practitioners somehow come on board in terms of their actual conduct. Again we see the easy application by economists of an extreme version of Friedman's positivism. Financial economists have more luck convincing practitioners of the merits of the idea of capital market efficiency: if there existed proÞtable trading rules investors would exploit them, and the resulting shifts in asset prices would eliminate the opportunities. Puzzlement reappears, however, when it is asserted that present-value pricing and capital market efficiency are in fact equivalent, so there is no justiÞcation for skepticism about present-value pricing combined with acceptance of capital market efficiency.
But the two are actually not quite equivalent: the efficient markets characterization of returns implies the present-value relation only if there are no bubbles. A world of rational bubbles conforms to practitioners' intuitive ideas: asset prices are not accurately described as the present value of their dividend streams, but there do not exist unexploited proÞtable trading rules.
Rational bubbles, unlike the explanations for Þnancial market misbehavior favored in behavioral Þnance, have falsiÞable implications. In fact, it is easy to point to phenomena which rational bubbles cannot possibly explain. The equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott [52] is a clear example. Mehra and Prescott focused on the implications of absence of arbitrage on returns. These predictions hold whether or not there exist bubbles, so the presence of bubbles cannot explain why the predictions appear not to be satisÞed.
Asset prices have been shown innumerable times to depend strongly on variables not easy to reconcile with the present-value relation (for example, Victor Niederhoffer [54] , David M. Cutler, James M. Poterba and Lawrence H. Summers [16] , Richard Roll [59] ). To the extent that these dependences imply proÞtable trading rules, they are genuine anomalies. However, for the most part they do not do so. Therefore they should be interpreted as evidence of rational bubbles combined with sunspots.
